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We provide a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order, and
hybrid markets and analyze the impact that the organization of trading has
on volume, liquidity, and price eﬃciency. We ﬁnd, in particular, that trading
volume is highest in the limit order market and lowest in the dealer market.
Small order price impacts are lowest and large order price impacts are highest
in limit order markets. Prices are most eﬃcient in the hybrid market and
least eﬃcient in the dealer market, except when the level of informed trading
is very high. Post-trade market transparency in a hybrid market hampers
price eﬃciency for thinly traded securities. We further identify that traders
behave as contrarians.
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‡Email: andreas.park@utoronto.ca; web: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/∼apark/.Intra-day ﬁnancial market trading is organized using two major mechanisms: order
driven and quote driven trading. Order driven markets typically employ a public limit
order book. In quote driven markets, all trades are arranged by designated institutions
that post quotes. The latter markets are commonly referred to as dealer markets. Many
real world markets are hybrids, combining both organizational forms.1
The coexistence of competitive limit order and dealer markets and the diﬀerences
in their trading outcomes have long been challenged by academic research. Madhavan
(1992) shows that, with competitive liquidity provision, a quote driven system and a
uniform price order driven system lead to identical outcomes. Glosten (1994) and Back
and Baruch (2007) argue that a quote driven system that competes with a discriminatory
limit order book in an anonymous market would mimic the limit order book.
Our paper builds on this line of research but serves a diﬀerent purpose. We posit non-
anonymity, in the sense that repeat order submissions are identiﬁed, and thus eﬀectively
take the coexistence of the mechanisms as given. Our goal is to describe the relative
advantages and disadvantages of the three trading systems: a discriminatory limit order
book, a dealer market, and a hybrid market.
Our major contribution is twofold. First, we provide an integrated theoretical frame-
work that admits a three-way comparison. The diﬀerences in trading outcomes of the
three trading mechanisms in our setting highlight, in particular, the signiﬁcance of the
discriminatory order book and post-trade market transparency. Second, we employ our
framework to derive novel empirical predictions for the impact of the organization of
trading on volume, liquidity, and price eﬃciency. In comparing competitive markets,
we complement the literature on markets where liquidity providers have market power
(e.g., Seppi (1997)), which we discuss below.
Limit order and dealer markets diﬀer in many aspects. One deﬁning feature of the
systems is the level of market transparency enjoyed by the liquidity providers. Limit or-
ders are posted prior to the liquidity demand realization, whereas dealers’ quotes account
for the order size. We show that this diﬀerence in the liquidity providers information
both yields new empirical predictions and explains a large share of the previously noted
heterogeneity among the trading outcomes.
The liquidity providers in the dealer market are able to determine the information
1See Harris (2003) for a comprehensive list. For example, on the NYSE and the Toronto Stock
Exchange, traders can either send orders directly to the limit order book (the “downstairs” market)
or arrange trades via ﬂoor brokers (NYSE) or “upstairs” dealers (Toronto); on Nasdaq, trades can be
arranged on INET or through a dealer. Finally, a hybrid structure also arises when a limit order book
competes with a dealer market. An example is Paris Bourse (a limit order market) and London Stock
Exchange (a dealer market, until recently), which compete for the order ﬂow in cross-listed stocks.
1content of a transaction most accurately. The high level of transparency on the side
of liquidity suppliers, however, lowers liquidity demanders’ rents and causes them to
trade less aggressively. The eﬃciency gain that stems from the dealers’ informational
advantage is thus muted by the lowest trading volume. We ﬁnd that the liquidity demand
reduction eﬀect dominates, so that the lack of trading activity renders the dealer market
to be least informationally eﬃcient, except when the level of informed trading is very
high. The hybrid market combines the limit order market’s aggressive order submission
with the dealer market’s superior screening ability and yields the most eﬃcient prices.
We thus reject the commonly argued hypothesis that the presence of the upstairs dealer
who absorbs a large fraction of uninformed order ﬂow (“skims the cream”) necessarily
hurts the main (limit order book) exchange participants.
Our model has the following structure. Liquidity demanders trade either for reasons
outside the model (e.g., to rebalance their portfolio), or they have private information
about the security’s fundamental value and optimally choose the size and direction of
their trade (or abstain from trading). Liquidity is supplied by competitive, uninformed,
and risk-neutral institutions, as in standard market microstructure models in the tradi-
tion of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).2
In the dealer-market, the liquidity providers observe the order ﬂow and then compete
for it in a Bertrand fashion. The equilibrium price aggregates the information contained
in the order ﬂow. In the limit order market, liquidity providers post a schedule of buy and
sell limit orders, each for the purchase or sale of a speciﬁc number of units. We assume
a “discriminating” order book design, as in Glosten (1994), and the prices incorporate
the information revealed when the respective limit order is “hit” by a market order of
the same or larger size. The bid- and ask-prices in this setting are the “lower-tail” and
“upper-tail” conditional expectations of the security value. One additional contribution
of our paper is thus in formulating a model that tractably integrates both a limit order
book and a dealer market in a multi-unit Glosten and Milgrom sequential trading setup.
Our setup builds on Easley and O’Hara (1987) who study a dealer market where an
imperfectly informed trader, equipped with a signal of either high or low quality, submits
a large or a small order and usually chooses a mixed strategy.3 Our methodological
innovation is that we employ private signals of a continuum of qualities. We are then able
to focus on pure strategies and concisely characterize the equilibrium by the marginal
buyers and sellers. These marginal traders, and hence a trader’s choice of the order size,
2We further discuss the institutional features of dealer markets at the end of Section II.
3The setting is also related to Ozsoylev and Takayama (2008) who characterize an equilibrium of a
dealer market where perfectly informed traders can choose among multiple size orders.
2are endogenous to the market organization. This endogeneity and the fact that traders
with more precise information prefer to submit larger orders are the key to our results.
Liquidity providers in dealer markets know the order size and are thus intrinsically
better at pin-pointing the information content of a trade. As a result, when markets are
operated in isolation, small trades receive better execution prices in the dealer market
(that is, the bid-ask spread is smaller)4 and large trades are cheaper in the limit order
book. In a hybrid market, traders are additionally allowed to choose the segment to trade
in. Consequently, in equilibrium, trading costs in a hybrid market for each order size
must be the same across the two mechanisms. We show that to equalize the equilibrium
trading costs, the dealer segment of a hybrid market must absorb most large trades,
whereas the limit order segment will absorb most small trades. The total number of
transactions in the limit order segment is larger than that in the dealer market segment.
Further, large orders in the dealer market segment will have lower information content.
The results on the information content of trades are closely related to Seppi (1990)
and Grossman (1992). Seppi studies the behavior of a single, possibly informed, large
institution and ﬁnds, in particular, that repeated interactions among the exchange par-
ticipants lead to routing of the uninformed trades to the oﬀ-exchange dealers. In Seppi,
both the on exchange specialists and the oﬀ exchange dealers set prices according to a
Kyle (1985)-style dealer market pricing rule. Grossman studies the relation of upstairs
and downstairs markets, both of which employ uniform pricing rules. In his model some
traders may leave a non-binding indication to trade with the upstairs dealers, which
increases the eﬀective liquidity in the upstairs segment. We complement this line of
research by studying traders’ self-selection into dealer and limit order segments, where
the latter employs a discriminatory pricing rule.
Our analysis further shows that the behavior of traders in the dealer and hybrid
markets is not stationary. For instance, as prices drop, unfavorably informed traders
submit sell-orders less aggressively and favorably informed traders submit buy orders
more aggressively, thus acting as contrarians. This result is supported by recent empirical
ﬁndings (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)) and we thus contribute to the
literature by providing theoretical underpinnings for rational contrarian behavior.
In the second part of our paper, we compare market widths, price impacts, price
eﬃciency, and trading volume in the three trading mechanisms: pure dealer markets,
pure limit order books, and hybrid markets. In addition to the aforementioned results
on eﬃciency and execution costs, we ﬁnd that trading volume is the highest in the
4This property is known as the “small trade spread” and was previously shown, e.g., in Glosten
(1994).
3limit order market and the lowest in the dealer market. Finally, price impacts of small
orders are stronger in dealer markets and those of large orders are stronger in limit order
markets.
Our results on the price impacts of small trades may seem surprising at ﬁrst: despite
the smaller spreads, price impacts are larger in the dealer markets. To understand this,
recall that small order prices in the limit order book account for the fact that the order
might be large. Consequently, when a small order executes in a limit order book, the
transaction price overshoots. The market participants will correct their expectations
of the security once they know the order size, and the permanent price impact of the
transaction will be smaller.
In the hybrid market this correction only occurs if there is post trade transparency in
that market participants observe the segment that the order cleared in. The ﬁnal result
of our paper describes how a lack of post-trade transparency aﬀects price eﬃciency. We
ﬁnd that noisier learning in an opaque market reduces market eﬃciency in frequently
traded stocks. Interestingly, when trading activity is low, the eﬀect of noisier learning is
outweighed by that of larger price adjustments, and the opaque market is more eﬃcient.
Other aspects of transparency have been studied in the literature. Pagano and Roell
(1996) compare transparency of a uniform price auction with a dealer market system.
Brown and Zhang (1997) combine a Kyle (1985)-style and a rational expectations style
setup to study dealers’ decisions to participate in a market, and to describe how deal-
ers’ decisions to supply liquidity aﬀect the informational eﬃciency of prices. Boulatov
and George (2008) analyze the eﬀects of transparency in a uniform price market with
informed and strategic liquidity provision.
Finally, market structures have also been compared in the literature that studies
the strategic provision of liquidity.5 Seppi (1997) studies a hybrid market, in which a
monopolistic specialist competes with a pure limit order book, as is the case on the
NYSE. He ﬁnds, in particular, that small orders receive better executions in the hybrid
market whereas medium orders receive better executions in the pure limit order market.
Parlour and Seppi (2003) extend Seppi (1997) by studying competition between these two
exchanges. Buti (2007) builds on Seppi (1997) and adds relationship trading and price-
quantity based screening by the specialist. We complement these studies by analyzing
hybrid markets where competitive dealers compete with the limit order book, as is the
case on many major equity markets.6
5Most papers on the strategic provision of liquidity are based on either Parlour (1998) or Foucault
(1999); for an extensive up-to-date survey of the literature on limit order markets see Parlour and Seppi
(2008).
6Examples are Nasdaq (dealer vs. INET), Toronto Stock Exchange (upstairs vs. downstairs), LSE
4The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model.
Section II derives the equilibria for the three trading mechanisms. Section III develops
testable predictions for the hybrid market. Section IV compares the three mechanisms
with respect to execution costs, volume, and price eﬃciency. Section V analyzes the
impact of post-trade transparency in the hybrid market. Section VI discusses the results
and possible policy implications. Appendix A derives properties of traders’ information
structures, Appendix B outlines the simulation procedures, and Appendix C contains all
proofs. Most ﬁgures and tables are at the end of the manuscript, in particular, Tables III
and IV, which summarize our ﬁndings and existent empirical support for our predictions.
I The Basic Setup
A General Market Organization
We consider a stylized model of security trading, in which informed and uninformed
traders trade a single security by submitting market orders. At each discrete point in
time there is exactly one trader who arrives at the market according to some random
process. These individuals trade upon their arrival and only then. Short positions are
ﬁlled at the true fundamental value.
Liquidity is supplied by uninformed, risk-neutral institutions that compete for order
ﬂow and earn zero expected proﬁts. In the limit order market, the liquidity providers
post a series of limit buy- and sell-orders. The former constitutes a series of ask-prices,
the latter a series of bid-prices. Each price is for a single unit (i.e. a round lot). Traders
post market orders after observing these prices.7 In the dealer market, the trader posts
his market order ﬁrst and the liquidity providing dealers then compete in a Bertrand
fashion for this order.8 In a hybrid market, both systems coexist.
B Model Details
Security: There is a single risky security with a liquidation value V from a set of two
potential values, V ∈ {0,1}, with Pr(V =1) = 1/ 2.
Traders: There is an inﬁnitely large pool of traders out of which one is drawn at
each point in time at random. Each trader is equipped with private information with
vs. Paris Bourse (for cross listed stocks), or Deutsche B¨ orse (makler vs. XETRA).
7When referring to a liquidity provider in singular, we will use the female form and for liquidity
demanders we will use the male form.
8At the end of Section II we will formally argue that our model can accommodate public dealer
quotes.
5probability   > 0; if not informed, a trader becomes a noise trader (probability 1 −  ).
The informed traders are risk neutral and rational.
Noise traders have no information and trade randomly. These traders are not neces-
sarily irrational, but they trade for reasons outside of this model, for example to obtain
cash by liquidating a position.9 To simplify the exposition, we assume that noise traders
make trades of either direction and size with equal probability.
Trade Size: All trades are market orders for round lots. The order at time t is
denoted by ot where ot < 0 indicates a sell-order and ot > 0 is a buy-order. Traders can
submit a large order, |ot| = 2, a small order, |ot| = 1, or abstain from trading, ot = 0.
C Information
Public Information: The structure of the model and the prior distribution of fun-
damentals is common knowledge among all market participants. The identity of a
trader and his signal are private information. The public information Ht at date t > 1
is the sequence of orders ot and realized transaction prices at all dates prior to t:
Ht = ((o1,p1),...,(ot−1,pt−1)). H1 refers to the initial history before trades occur.
Liquidity Providers’ Information: In the dealer market, the liquidity providers
know the public history Ht and the order ot. In the limit order market, liquidity providers
do not know which order will be posted at time t, and their information is only Ht.
Informed Traders’ Information: We follow the sequential trading literature in
the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (henceforth: GM) and assume that traders
receive a binary signal about the true liquidation value V . These signals are private, and
they are independently distributed, conditional on the value V . Speciﬁcally, informed
trader i is told “with chance qi, the liquidation value is High/Low (h/l)” where
Pr(signal|true value) V = 0 V = 1
signal = l qi 1 − qi
signal = h 1 − qi qi
This qi is the signal quality. In contrast to most of the GM literature, we assume
that these signals come in a continuum of qualities and that qi is trader i’s private
information. The distribution of qualities is independent of the security’s true value
and can be understood as reﬂecting, for instance, the distribution of traders’ talents to
analyze securities. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of noise and informed traders
9Assuming the presence of noise traders is common practice in the literature on micro-structure with














































Figure 1: Illustration of signals and noise. This ﬁgure illustrates the mechanics of our signal
distribution: ﬁrst, it is determined whether a trader is informed (probability µ) or noise (probability
1 − µ). If informed, the trader obtains a signal quality. Next, he receives the “correct” signal (h when
V = 1 and l when V = 0) with probability qi and the “wrong” signal with probability 1 − qi. (The
draw of V is identical for all agents.) If the trader is noise, he will be a large and small buyer and seller
with equal probabilities.
and the information structure.
In what follows, we will combine the binary signal (h or l) and its quality on [1/ 2,1] in a
single variable on [0,1], namely, the trader’s private belief that the security’s liquidation
value is high (V = 1). This belief is the trader’s posterior on V = 1 after he learns his
quality and sees his private signal but before he observes the public history. A trader’s
behavior given his private signal and its quality can then be equivalently described in
terms of the trader’s private belief. This approach allows us to characterize the equilibria
in terms of a continuous scalar variable (as opposed to a vector) and thus simpliﬁes the
exposition.
The private belief is obtained by Bayes Rule and coincides with the signal quality
if the signal is h, πi = Pr(V = 1|h) = qi/(qi + (1 − qi)) = qi. Likewise, πi = 1 − qi if
the signal is l. In what follows, we will denote the density of private beliefs by f1(π)
when the fundamental is V = 1 and by f0(π) when V = 0. Appendix A ﬂeshes out how
these densities are obtained from the underlying distribution of qualities and it provides
a numerical example.
7II Dealer, Limit Order and Hybrid Markets
In what follows, we will focus on the buy side of the market; analogous results apply to
the sell side. We will use L for the limit order market, D for the dealer market, and H
for the hybrid market. When discussing ﬁndings for the hybrid market, we write HL for
the limit order segment and HD for the dealer market segment.
The Trader’s Decision. An informed trader receives his private signal, observes
all past trades, and can trade upon arrival and only then. In the limit order market, he
observes the posted prices, in the dealer market, he forms expectations about the price
that he would be quoted, conditional on each order size. The trader chooses the order
size to maximize his expected proﬁts or abstains from trading if he expects to make
negative trading proﬁts.
Denote the total execution cost of a size ot order by Ct(ot). To compress notation,
we write the expectation of a trader with belief π after history Ht as E[V |Ht,π] =: Etπ.
Then the payoﬀ to submitting a buy order of size ot for this trader is ot   Etπ − Ct(ot).
A trader’s expectation is increasing in the private belief. We thus focus on monotone
decision rules, i.e. the higher the trader’s belief is, the more he wants to buy. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that traders use a “threshold” rule: they buy two units if their private belief π
is at or above the time-t buy threshold π2
t, π ≥ π2
t, they buy one unit if their belief is at
or above π1
t but below π2
t, π ∈ [π1
t,π2
t), and they do not buy otherwise. To simplify the
exposition, we will henceforth omit subscript t.
The marginal buyer of two units, π2, is indiﬀerent between buying one and two
units. The marginal buyer of one unit, π1, is indiﬀerent between buying one unit and
abstaining. Consequently, π1 and π2 solve respectively
1   Eπ
1 = C(1), 2   Eπ
2 − C(2) = 1   Eπ
2 − C(1). (1)
Price Setting: Limit Order Book. The liquidity providers anticipate the traders’
behavior given the marginal buyers π1
L,π2
L. The limit orders account for the information
content of the market orders that they would be executed against. The limit order prices
are the ask prices. The price ask
1
L is the price for the ﬁrst unit sold by liquidity providers,
and it accounts for the fact that this unit is purchased by demanders of order size o ≥ 1.
The price ask
2
L is the price for the second unit, and it accounts for the fact that the trade
8size is o = 2. As liquidity providers earn zero expected proﬁts, it must hold that10
ask
1












Price Setting: Dealer Market. Since the liquidity demanders submit their orders
before prices are posted, the information available to a dealer includes the size of the
order. This implies that traders pay a uniform price for each unit that they buy.11
Although traders do not know the price of their transaction before posting a market
order, given the marginal buyers π1
D,π2
D, they can perfectly anticipate the quote. In
light of this, we will henceforth refer to prices for buy orders as ask-prices. Then
ask
1





D = E[V | trader buys o = 2 units at {ask
2
D},Ht].


















In the dealer market, we have CD(1) = ask
1
D and CD(2) = 2ask
2
















In the limit order market, the ﬁrst unit is bought by traders who demand one or two
units. In the dealer market, the single unit is purchased only by traders who demand
just one unit. Let βo
v,m denote the probability that there is a buy of o ∈ {1,2} units
when the value of the security is v ∈ {0,1} in market m ∈ {L,D},
β1
v,L = 2λ +  (1 − Fv(π1
L)), β2
v,L = λ +  (1 − Fv(π2
L)),
β1
v,D = λ +  (Fv(π2
D) − Fv(π1
D)), β2
v,D = λ +  (1 − Fv(π2
D)).
The probability that a given trader is informed is independent of other traders’ identities
and the security’s liquidation value. As private beliefs are independent conditional on
the security’s value, so are traders’ actions. Suppressing indices L and D, the ask prices
for unit o ∈ {1,2} and the expectation of the marginal trader πo can be written explicitly
10This pricing rule is analogous to the one in Glosten (1994).
11This pricing rule is identical to the one used in Easley and O’Hara (1987); a more recent contribution












πop + (1 − πo)(1 − p)
. (4)
Hybrid Markets. Most real world equity markets operate with a hybrid structure
where traders have the choice of either arranging their trade with a dealer or posting it
to the limit order book.12 We now consider a trader’s choice of order size and trading
venue. We focus on the arguably most realistic scenario where both small and large
quantities are traded in both market segments.13
In the isolated markets, the equilibrium description contained, loosely, information
about who traded how many units. In hybrid markets, the equilibrium description must
additionally include information about where someone trades. Suppose now that all
order sizes are traded in each segment. Then the execution costs for orders of the same
size must coincide across the two market segments because otherwise traders would
switch to the cheaper segment. Put diﬀerently, in equilibrium traders must now self-
select into market segments in such a way that trading costs coincide.
This cost equalization implies, in particular, that the marginal informed traders
coincide in both market segments. Prices will then depend on the proportion of informed
to noise traders. In equilibrium, loosely, the proportion must be such that it ensures
equal costs across market segments. There are several ways to model the implied self-
selection. We approach it by assuming that informed traders trade in each segment
with equal chance, and we then study the self-selection of noise traders that yields the
equilibrium.14
Speciﬁcally, let λo
m denote the mass of noise traders that submit buy orders of size o ∈
{1,2} to market segment m ∈ {HL,HD}. We then express βo
v,m, the probability of a buy




HL +  (1 − Fv(π1
H))/2, β2
v,HL = λ2








HD +  (1 − Fv(π2
H))/2.
12For instance, on the Toronto Stock Exchange traders can approach an upstairs dealer or they can
send their order directly to the consolidated limit order book. Some systems are more complex: for
instance, on NYSE, a market order that arrives at the specialist’s desk could be ﬁlled with the current
book, with the specialist or with ﬂoor brokers who opt to participate, or the specialist can auction the
order to ﬂoorbrokers. On Nasdaq, small orders are routed to dealers according to a set of rules. We
abstract from these institutional subtleties, and focus on the main distinction between the two general
systems.
13In Grossman (1992) there are corner solutions in which all order ﬂow gravitates towards a speciﬁc
trading mechanism while the other disappears. Our model also admits corner solutions but they have
a diﬀerent ﬂavour: each mechanism attracts a unique order size and both remain in operation. The
existence result for corner solutions has been omitted to save space.
14In Section VI we discuss extensions of our model.
10Ask prices and traders’ expectations are expressed in the same way as in (4). We main-
tain the assumption that liquidity traders demand each quantity with equal probability,
thus λo
HD = λ−λo
HL and we will use only λo = λo
HL. We then ﬁnd the equilibrium by de-
termining (a) the marginal buyers who are indiﬀerent between trading one and two units
(π2
H) and one and no units (π1
H) and (b) the noise masses λ1,λ2 that ensure equal costs.
This gives rise to the following four equations that π1
H,π2
H,λ1,λ2 solve in equilibrium
CHL(1) = CHD(1), CHL(2) = CHD(2), Eπ
1 = C(1), 2   Eπ
2 − C(2) = 1  Eπ
2 − C(1). (5)
Costs CHL(1),CHD(1) are the ask-prices, CHD(2) = 2 ask
2





Theorem 1 (Existence in Limit Order, Dealer, and Hybrid Markets)
For any prior p ∈ (0,1)
(a) [Limit Order Market] there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with marginal
beliefs 1/2 < π1
L < π2
L < 1 that solve the equations in (2);
(b) [Dealer Market] there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with marginal
beliefs 1/2 < π1
D < π2
D < 1 that solve the equations in (3);
(c) [Hybrid Market] there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with marginal
beliefs 1/2 < π1
H < π2
H < 1 and noise levels λ1,λ2 that solve the equations in (5).
(d) [Monotonicity] The decision rules in (a) − (c) are monotone: traders with private
beliefs π < π1 do not buy, traders with private beliefs π ∈ [π1,π2) buy one unit, and
traders with private beliefs π ∈ [π2,1] buy two units.
Public Dealer Market Quotes. Our treatment of price formation in the dealer
market is stylized: people submit their market orders without knowing the price and
there are no standing quotes from dealers. In real markets dealers do publicly quote bid
and oﬀer prices. Moreover, in many markets, dealers are required to trade a guaranteed
minimum number of units at these quotes (for instance, for most stocks a Nasdaq dealer’s
quote “must be good” for 1,000 shares). On some exchanges, e.g. the TSX, the upstairs
dealers are required to trade at the best bid or oﬀer (BBO) that are currently on the
book, unless the size of the trade is very large. Exchanges that use small-order routing
systems (i.e. small orders are given to dealers according to a pre-determined set of rules)
require dealers to “improve prices” to at least match the BBO.
These institutional details are compatible with our setup. First, in the equilibrium
of our model traders can perfectly anticipate the price that they will be quoted if they
approach a dealer. Second, our model can be rewritten to accommodate (a) public
quotes in the dealer market and (b) minimum ﬁll sizes for these quotes. In this rewritten
version of the model, the quoted ask price would be ask
2
D, the price for a large order.
11When facing a small order, the dealer would then improve the price to ask
1
D. This
alternative setup would also satisfy the BBO rule for hybrid markets. We chose our
current formulation to simplify the exposition.
III Testable Predictions for the Hybrid Market
The hybrid market equilibrium is determined by the marginal traders and by the frac-
tions of noise traders in each market segment, which in turn aﬀect the informativeness
of trades.
Suppose a small trade arrives in the dealer market segment. Then the dealer knows
that the trade stems from an informed trader with belief π ∈ [π1
H,π2
H) or from a noise
trader. The ﬁrst unit in the limit order segment, on the other hand, is hit by orders
from informed traders with beliefs π ∈ [π1
H,1]. Ceteris paribus, this should make the
single unit trade in the limit order segment more informative and thus more expensive.
To have equal costs, intuitively, there must be more noise in the limit order segment.
The reverse applies to large orders. The following result conﬁrms this intuition.
Proposition 1 (Trade Informativeness in the Hybrid Market Equilibrium) The
ratio of noise to informed traders of small size orders is larger in the limit order seg-
ment, and the ratio of noise to informed traders of large size orders is larger in the dealer
segment.
Proposition 1 provides a theoretical basis for the empirical ﬁnding that upstairs markets
—which loosely correspond to the dealer market segment— are better at identifying
uninformed trades. Our result shows that the co-existence of the two major trading
mechanisms necessarily implies that more uninformed traders seek to trade large quan-
tities with dealers.
The information content of trades implied by Proposition 1 is similar to that in
Seppi (1990), where a large, possibly informed trader has the choice between trading
anonymously on the exchange or non-anonymously oﬀ the exchange. If he chooses the
latter option, he may be punished, due to repeated interactions, for “bagging the street”.
This threat drives traders’ self selection. Notably, the pricing mechanisms on and oﬀ
the exchange in Seppi (1990) follow a Kyle (1985)-style dealer market pricing rule. We
thus complement Seppi (1990) by studying traders’ self-selection into dealer and limit
order segments.
Since the mass of informed traders in either market segment is the same, Proposition 1
implies that there are more small noise trades in the limit order segment and more large
12noise trades in the dealer segment. We can further show that there are in total more
noise traders that trade either quantity in the limit order segment.
Proposition 2 (Transactions by Market Segment)
(a) There are more large transactions in the dealer segment than in the limit order
segment; the reverse holds for small transactions.
(b) The limit order segment attracts more transactions than the dealer segment.
IV Comparison of the Three Trading Mechanisms
We will now analyze how the diﬀerent market mechanisms aﬀect spreads, execution
costs, and volume and how eﬃcient the systems are relative to each other. Our goal is
to generate testable predictions for these major observable variables.
A Spreads, Market Width, and Price Impacts.
We will ﬁrst compare the trading mechanisms with respect to market liquidity, namely
market width and price impacts.
Market width (sometimes also referred to as market breadth) is the cost of doing
a trade of a given size. It is the dual of market depth, which measures the size of a
trade that can be arranged at a given cost.15 For small trades, the width is associated
with the bid-ask-spread. When people trade for informational reasons, a larger width
indicates higher adverse selection costs and thus a lower willingness to provide liquidity.
We measure width for order size o by the dollar cost of a buy transaction, C(o).
The price impact reﬂects how the market assesses the information content of a trade.
If the current transaction price and the public expectation coincide, then the price impact
is the diﬀerence between the current and the past transaction price. If they diﬀer, then
the price impact reﬂects the permanent eﬀect of a trade on prices.16 We quantify the
price impact by ∆pi = E[V |Ht,transaction of size i at time t] − E[V |Ht].
15See Harris (2003), pp. 398-399, for the deﬁnitions of depth and width and for an extensive discussion.
16Loosely, permanent eﬀects are associated with information transmission, temporary eﬀects are
associated with uninformative inventory re-balancing. Empirically the price impact is measured as
the diﬀerence between the eﬀective spread and the realized spread, where the eﬀective spread is the
transaction price at time t minus the midpoint of the bid-ask-spread at t and the realized spread is
the transaction price at t minus the midpoint of the bid-ask-spread x minutes later at t + x (see, for
instance, Bessembinder (2003)).
13Proposition 3 (Liquidity Measures)
(a) Market width for small trades is ordered as follows: CD(1) < CH(1) < CL(1).
Market width for large trades is ordered as follows: CL(2) < CH(2) < CD(2).










The intuition underlying these results is that liquidity providers in dealer markets are
intrinsically better at pin-pointing the information content of a transaction because they
know the order size before setting the price. While this lowers traders’ information rents,
those with lower quality information are better oﬀ being identiﬁed, as is demonstrated
by the lower spreads in the dealer market. For in the limit order market, very well
informed traders hide among the less well informed ones and thus earn a rent at their
expense.17
In GM models with single unit trades, the price impact is the change in the transac-
tion price. In our model, this remains true in the dealer market and the dealer segment
of the hybrid market. In the limit order market and the limit order segment of the
hybrid market, however, the public expectation of the security value coincides with the
transaction price only after large orders, but not after small orders.
To understand this point, observe that in limit order markets, the ask price for the
single unit trade accounts for the fact that all informed traders with belief π ∈ [π1,1]
buy this unit. Yet after it is revealed that an arriving trader bought only one unit, it
is known that this trade was performed by an informed trader with belief π ∈ [π1,π2]
(or by a noise trader). As a consequence, the price impact of small orders in the limit
order segment is intuitively smaller than that implied by the transaction price. Hence
the displayed order of price impacts. Finally, numerical simulations reveal that ∆p1
HL
and ∆p1
L cannot be ordered.
B Dynamic Behavior
In the limit order market, the history of trades does not aﬀect a trader’s decision to buy
or sell. In the dealer market and hybrid market, the behavior is history dependent.
Proposition 4 (Behavioral Dynamics and Contrarianism)
As p traverses from 0 to 1,
(a) trading behavior does not change in the limit order market,
(b) all trading thresholds increase in the dealer market, and
(c) all trading thresholds increase in the hybrid market.
17The result that small trades are cheaper on dealer markets has been previously noted by, for
instance, Glosten (1994) or Seppi (1997).
14Part (a) is implied by expressions (2) and (4). In the dealer and hybrid markets, however,
the marginal types change with the prior p. If the prior favours a trader’s opinion, two
eﬀects occur. First, the trader feels more encouraged by the public opinion. Second,
the marginal value of his information declines. Traders “herd” when the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates so that they need lower quality signals to trade. Traders “act as contrarians”
when the second eﬀects dominates so that they need higher quality signals. Proposition
4 shows the latter for the dealer and hybrid markets, in line with empirical observations
(see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)).
C Volume
The results in the remainder of this section are based on simulations of the trading
process for the case of a uniformly distributed quality (see the example in Appendix A).
Although our model describes single trader arrivals for each period, we can proxy
volume in market m ∈ {L,D,H} at prior p = Pr(V = 1) by the expected number of






|o|   Pr(o|V = v,m,p)   Pr(V = v).
We compute vol numerically on a ﬁne grid for the feasible parameters (the prior p and
the amount of informed trading  ) and ﬁnd the following.
Numerical Observation 1 (Volume) For any prior p and any level of informed trad-
ing  , volume is ordered as follows: volL > volH > volD.
Figure 3 illustrates this numerical observation. The intuition for the ﬁnding stems from
the behavior of the traders who submit large orders. In the dealer market, large order
traders are identiﬁed, whereas in the limit order market they hide among the small
order traders. As a consequence, the marginal buyer of the large quantity has the
highest belief in the dealer market and the lowest belief in the limit order market (we
show this formally in the proof of the existence theorem). Traders thus submit large
orders least aggressively in the dealer market and most aggressively in the limit order
market, which leads to the lowest and highest volumes respectively.
D Price Eﬃciency
Price eﬃciency measures the closeness of a price to the fundamental value of a security.
We analyze it in two ways. First, we compute the expected price impact for each trading
15mechanism. Second, we simulate sequences of trades that mimic the arrival of traders
during a speciﬁc trading day. The ﬁnal price after a sequence can be interpreted as
the closing price. We then base our analysis of price eﬃciency on the properties of the
expected price impacts and of the closing prices.
We perform our analysis of closeness for the fundamental value V = 1.18 Then the
higher the public expectation, the closer it is to the true value. Thus higher price impacts
and closing prices are associated with a more eﬃcient market mechanism.
We measure the price impact by the change in the public expectation. We thus
compute numerically for all priors p ∈ (0,1), levels of informed trading   ∈ (0,1) and
market mechanisms m ∈ {L,D,H}, using E[V |p] = p,
E[∆pm|V = 1,p] =
X
o∈{−2,−1,0,1,2}
Pr(o|V = 1,m,p)   E[V |o,m,p] − p. (6)
To simplify the exposition, we use E∆pm for the expected price impact.
We obtain the simulated closing prices as follows. For each level of informed trading
  ∈ {.1,...,.9} we simulated 500,000 trading days with entry rates ρ ∈ {10,...,50}. For
each day, we generated random realizations for the number of traders (a Poisson arrival;
parameter ρ) and their entry order, traders’ identities (noise vs. informed; parameter
 ), trading decisions for noise traders, and beliefs for informed traders (ﬁxing the fun-
damental value to V = 1). The public expectation that obtains after these traders have
acted is the closing price for that day.19 The signal quality distribution is assumed to
be uniform.
We assess closeness of closing prices to the fundamental value in two ways. First,
we compare the average closing prices. Second, we compare the empirical distribu-
tions of closing prices to see if one mechanism systematically yields higher and thus
more eﬃcient prices. “Systematically higher” in a distributional sense obtains if the
empirical distributions of prices can be ranked in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dom-
inance. By deﬁnition, distribution Fx ﬁrst order stochastically dominates distribution Fy
if Fx(p) ≤ Fy(p) for all closing prices p. We will thus compare the diﬀerences of empirical
distributions.
To ensure that the distribution of closing prices is reasonably smooth, we focus on the
18To measure closeness to the true fundamental, we need to ﬁx this value. The analysis for the case
of V = 0 is symmetric.
19As we discussed after Proposition 3 this public expectation may diﬀer from the last transaction
price. To simplify the exposition, we will refer to the last value of the public expectation as a “closing
price”.
16case ρ = 50 when analyzing properties of the empirical distributions of prices.20 Further
parametric and procedural details of the simulation process are outlined in Appendix B.
We write Fm,¯ pm, and σm for the empirical distribution, average, and standard deviation
of closing prices in market m ∈ {L,D,H}.
In presenting our results we are loose in listing them for “low”, “middle” and
“high”  . These regions of   diﬀer slightly for diﬀerent ρ.21 Table I displays the signs of
the diﬀerences in averages and illustrates the observation; Figure 5 plots the diﬀerences
of expected price impacts. Note that an ordering in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance implies the same ordering for the average prices; we report both measures
for completeness.
Numerical Observation 2 (Price Eﬃciency)
(a) For low  : E∆pD < E∆pL < E∆pH and ¯ pD < ¯ pL < ¯ pH.
(b) For medium  : E∆pD < E∆pL < E∆pH, ¯ pD < ¯ pL < ¯ pH, and FH fosd FL fosd FD.
(c) For high  : E∆pL < E∆pH < E∆pD, ¯ pL < ¯ pH < ¯ pD, and FD fosd FH fosd FL.
The results on expected price impacts and price distributions are consistent: the hybrid
market dominates the limit order market, which dominates the dealer market, except
when   is very large. We do not have conclusive results concerning the price distributions
for low levels of  , where prices are driven largely by noise.
An eﬃciency measure based on the average price alone could be criticized if higher
average prices go along with higher price volatility. Indeed, this is what we observe for
low   where σH > σL > σD. For medium and high levels of  , however, this criticism
does not apply. The ﬁrst order stochastic dominance ordering implies the same ordering
in the sense of second order stochastic dominance, and thus more eﬃcient prices are also
less dispersed.
Numerical Observation 2 argues, in particular, that the hybrid market is more eﬃ-
cient than the pure limit order market. The dealer segment thus serves an important
role in enhancing market eﬃciency. To see the intuition for this, observe, ﬁrst, that
in the hybrid market most noise traders of large size orders submit them in the dealer
market segment (Proposition 1). Second, relative to informed traders, noise traders are
more likely to trade in the “wrong” direction. Finally, the price impact of a large order
in the pure limit order book is smaller than that in the limit order segment and larger
than that in the dealer market segment (Proposition 3). In other words, the limit order
20For ρ = 50 there are on average 50 traders per day, yielding decisions for about 25,000,000 traders.
21For instance, for ρ = 50, the “middle” µ is between .3 and .7. The general observation is that the
region of “middle” µ increases in the average number of traders, ρ.
17segment of the hybrid market attracts most of the “right” direction large trades and
these have the highest price impact; the converse obtains for the dealer market segment.
Together these eﬀects imply the relation between hybrid and limit order markets.
V Transparency vs. Opacity in the Hybrid Market
Transparency is usually separated into pre-trade and post-trade transparency. The for-
mer reﬂects the information that trading parties possess before they either demand or
supply liquidity, the latter reﬂects their information about past transactions.
Our model assumes that liquidity demanders have full pre-trade transparency, i.e.
they can either see all available quotes (for the limit order book) or they can infer the
prices that they will be quoted in equilibrium (for the dealer market). Liquidity suppliers
face higher pre-trade transparency in the dealer market than in the limit order market,
because they know the order size for which they supply liquidity.
Post-trade transparency obtains in the limit order market because anyone can ob-
serve when and how far an order “walks the book”. We also assume full post-trade
transparency for the dealer market in that all transactions are disclosed.
Our analysis of the hybrid market thus far has assumed the same level of post-
trade transparency. In particular, we have assumed that after every transaction all
market participants learn the size of a trade and the segment it cleared in. We will now
investigate the impact of the information about the trading venue. In what follows we
refer to the market where the venue is revealed as the transparent market and we refer
to the market where the venue is not revealed as the opaque market.
In the opaque market, the price impact of any small trade is driven purely by the
transaction price. In the transparent market, on the other hand, small trades in the limit
order segment have smaller price impacts than those implied by the transaction prices.
We analyze the eﬀect of these diﬀerent price impacts on price eﬃciency, using the mea-
sures described in the last section. Table II and Figure 6 illustrate the following results.
Numerical Observation 3 (Transparency vs. Opacity)
(a) For a large enough entry rate ρ, the transparent market is more eﬃcient in the
sense that average closing prices there are higher and thus more eﬃcient; for small
entry rates it is the reverse.
(b) Prices in the transparent market are less volatile than those in the opaque market
in the sense of the second order stochastic dominance.
18The expected price impacts, or changes in the public expectation, as deﬁned in (6),
are not ordered, but the displayed patterns (see Figure 7) are consistent with the above
ﬁndings and provide an intuition for them. Recall that, ﬁxing the fundamental to V = 1,
larger price impacts are associated with higher eﬃciency. We observe that for low and
medium levels of the prior p, the expected price impact in the opaque market is larger
than that in the transparent market; the reverse holds for high levels of p. This switch
explains why the opaque market is more eﬃcient for low entry rates ρ (or, “thinly” traded
stocks). For small numbers of trades (low ρ), the public expectation moves little so that
the prior p remains close to 1/ 2 where the opaque markets yields stronger movements of
prices in the direction of the fundamental. Since on average, traders are more likely to
be “right” than “wrong”, when there are many trades (high entry rate ρ), the public
expectation will be close to the fundamental, 1, most of the time. In this region, the
transparent market yields larger price impacts and thus higher price eﬃciency.
The larger dispersion in the opaque market is explained by the fact that small trades
there move prices more strongly in either direction.
VI Conclusion
This paper provides a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order and hybrid
markets. We analyze the impact of these trading mechanisms on price eﬃciency, volume,
liquidity, and trade execution costs and generate several new empirical predictions.
The organization of trading, the regulations and the rules can diﬀer dramatically
among diﬀerent exchanges. Yet almost all trading arrangements can be classiﬁed as
one of the three mechanisms that this paper studies. Our model provides the bench-
mark diﬀerences that these mechanisms would display empirically, controlling for other
institutional details.
In addition to generating empirical predictions, our paper has implications for empir-
ical methodology. First, we identify that trading behavior in hybrid and dealer markets
changes throughout the trading day. Estimations that use aggregate numbers of trades,
as is common practice when estimating the probability of informed trading, must thus
account for this possibility. Second, our results indicate that the price impacts of small
trades in limit order markets are smaller than the changes in transaction prices. The
diﬀerence between these two measures reﬂects the information conveyed by the total
order size. Attributing this diﬀerence to inventory risk would overestimate such costs.
Finally, our ﬁndings have policy implications for professional market design. Histor-
ically, many equity markets have developed from pure dealer markets to hybrid markets
19where a dealer segment coexists with a limit order book. Our analysis highlights the
advantages of such developments, such as increased price eﬃciency and trading volume.
We further argue that a hybrid market has advantages over a pure limit order market
in that prices are more eﬃcient and costs for small orders are lower. The eﬃciency gain
stems from the stronger price impact of large trades in the limit order segment of the
hybrid market. Extending our model to allow exogenous variations in relative trading
volume in the market segments, we can show that this result requires suﬃcient volume
in the limit order book. If traders were to exogenously gravitate towards the dealer
segment so that there are only few transactions in the limit order segment, then the
informational advantage of the hybrid market would be lost. Thus market designers
and regulators may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to guarantee that a suﬃcient order ﬂow reaches
the limit order book. Indeed, some exchanges, e.g. the Toronto Stock Exchange, require
small orders to be routed to the limit order book.
A Appendix: Quality and Belief Distributions
Financial market microstructure models with binary signals and states typically employ
a constant common signal quality q ∈ [1/ 2,1], with Pr(signal = h|V = 1) = Pr(signal =
l|V = 0) = q. This parameterization is easy to interpret, as a trader who receives a high
signal h will update his prior in favor of the high liquidation value, V = 1, and a trader
who receives a low signal l will update his prior in favor of V = 0. We thus use the
conventional description of traders’ information, with qualities q ∈ [1/ 2,1], in the main
text.
As discussed in the main text, to facilitate the analysis, we map a vector of a trader’s
signal and its quality into a scalar continuous variable on [0,1], namely, the trader’s
private belief. To derive the distributions of traders’ private beliefs, it is mathematically
convenient to normalize the signal quality so that its domain coincides with that of
the private belief. We will denote the distribution function of this normalized quality
on [0,1] by G and its density by g, whereas the distribution and density functions of
original qualities on [1/ 2,1] will be denoted by ˜ G and ˜ g respectively.
The normalization proceeds as follows. Without loss of generality, we employ the
density function g that is symmetric around 1/2. For q ∈ [0, 1/2], we then have g(q) =
˜ g(1 − q)/2 and for q ∈ [1/ 2,1], we have g(q) = ˜ g(q)/2.
Under this speciﬁcation, signal qualities q and 1 − q are equally useful for the indi-
vidual: if someone receives signal h and has quality 1/ 4, then this signal has “the opposite
meaning”, i.e. it has the same meaning as receiving signal l with quality 3/ 4. Signal qual-
20ities are assumed to be independent across agents and independent of the fundamental
value V .
Beliefs are derived by Bayes Rule, given signals and signal qualities. Speciﬁcally, if
a trader is told that his signal quality is q and receives a high signal h then his belief
is q/[q + (1 − q)] = q (respectively 1 − q if he receives a low signal l), because the
prior is 1/ 2. The belief π is thus held by people who receive signal h and quality q = π
and by those who receive signal l and quality q = 1 − π. Consequently, the density
of individuals with belief π is given by f1(π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] when V = 1 and
analogously by f0(π) = (1−π)[g(π)+g(1−π)] when V = 0. Smith and Sorensen (2008)
prove the following property of private beliefs (Lemma 2 in their paper):
Lemma 1 (Symmetric beliefs, Smith and Sorensen (2008)) With the above the
signal quality structure, private belief distributions satisfy F1(π) = 1 − F0(1 − π) for
all π ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Since f1(π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] and f0(π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)], we




0 f0(1 − x)dx =
R 1
1−π f0(x)dx =
1 − F0(1 − π). ￿ Belief densities obey the monotone likelihood ratio property as the
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One can recover the distribution of qualities on [1/2,1], denoted by ˜ G, from G by
combining qualities that yield the same beliefs for opposing signals (e.g q = 1/4 and













g(s)ds = 2G(q) − 2G(
1/ 2) = 2G(q) − 1.
An Example of private beliefs. Figure 2 depicts an example where the signal
quality q is uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution implies that the density
of individuals with signals of quality q ∈ [1/2,1] is ˜ g(q) = 2q. When V = 1, private
beliefs π ≥ 1/ 2 are held by traders who receive signal h of quality q = π, private beliefs
π ≤ 1/ 2 are held by traders who receive signal l of quality q = 1−π. Thus, when V = 1,
the density of private beliefs π for π ∈ [1/ 2,1] is given by f1(π) = Pr(h|V = 1,q = π)˜ g(q =
π) = 2π and for π ∈ [0,1/ 2] it is given by f1(π) = Pr(l|V = 1,q = 1−π)˜ g(q = 1−π) = 2π.
Similarly, the density conditional on V = 0 is f0(π) = 2(1 − π). The distributions of









Figure 2: Plots of belief densities and distributions. Left Panel: The densities of beliefs for
an example with uniformly distributed qualities. The densities for beliefs conditional on the true
fundamental being 1 and 0 respectively are f1(π) = 2π and f0(π) = 2(1 − π); Right Panel: The
corresponding conditional distribution functions: F1(π) = π2 and F0(π) = 2π − π2.
signals are informative: recipients in favor of V = 0 are more likely to occur when V = 0
than when V = 1.
B Appendix: Simulation Procedure for Price Eﬃ-
ciency
We employed the following data generation procedure. We obtained 500,000 observations
of trading days for each of the Poisson arrival rates ρ ∈ {10,15,20,25, 30,35,40,45,50}
and levels of informed trading   ∈ {.1,.2,.3,.4,.5,.6, .7,.8,.9}. The Poisson arrival
rate ρ implies that, on average, ρ traders arrive on any given day (some may choose
not to trade). Fixing the fundamental to V = 1, higher prices are closer to the true
fundamental and thus more eﬃcient. To capture the eﬀect of the entry rate ρ for
transparent vs. opaque hybrid markets, we also ran these simulations for low entry rates
ρ ∈ {2,3,...,15} for   ∈ {.2,.5,.8}.
For each series, we ﬁrst drew the number of traders for the session and performed the
random allocation of traders into noise and informed and their entry order. Signals for
informed traders and trading roles for noise traders were assigned as depicted in Figure 1,
conditional on the fundamental being V = 1. These traders then acted in sequence, and
we determined the informed traders’ optimal decisions and (for the hybrid market) the
noise traders’ choice of the trading venue, based on the preceding history, as described
in Section II. We let the same sequence of traders act for each of the four trading rules
(limit order market, dealer marker, hybrid market, and opaque hybrid market); note
that the same informed trader may take diﬀerent decisions in diﬀerent markets. We
22then recorded the public expectation at the end of each sequence of traders for each of
the four trading rules.
Our random number generation employs the Mersenne Twister algorithm (Mat-
sumoto and Nishimura (1998)). This algorithm greatly reduces the correlation of suc-
cessive values that arises with most other pseudo-random number generators.
C Appendix: Omitted Proofs
C.1 Some General Results and Notation
We will ﬁrst introduce some notation and establish basic results that facilitate the anal-
ysis and proofs of our main results.
C.1.1 General notation for all proofs
In what follows, we will use function at(Λ,π,π) to denote the time-t liquidity provider’s
expectation of the security value conditional on a buy order that stems from either a
noise trader drawn from a mass of size Λ, or from an informed trader drawn from a mass
of size   and equipped with a private belief between π and π. Conditional on the true
value being V = v, the probability of such an order is βv(Λ,π,π) = Λ+ (Fv(π)−Fv(π)).










This speciﬁcation allows us to compactly express all equilibrium ask prices. For instance,




L,1). In the hybrid market, the mass of informed traders
in each segment is  /2, and the probability of, say, a small buy order in a limit order
segment is λ1+λ2+( /2) (Fv(π2
H)−Fv(π1
H)). Renormalizing, we can write the equilibrium
ask price for this order as ask
1
HL = at(2λ1 + 2λ2,π1
H,1). All other prices are similar.
Further, we will use function π∗
t(Λ,π) to denote π that solves
Etπ = at(Λ,π,π). (9)
Function π∗
t(Λ,π) will be useful in compactly expressing the equilibrium thresholds, and
we study its properties in more detail in the next subsection. In what follows, we will
omit the subscript t whenever the usage is clear from the context.
23C.1.2 Preliminary Properties
In what follows, it will often be mathematically convenient to express the private belief




s g(s) ds, F0(π) = 2
Z π
0
(1−s) g(s) ds ⇒ F1(π)+F0(π) = 2G(π), (10)
and by partial integration,




Lemma 2 (Properties of the equilibrium thresholds)
(a) For every (Λ,π) such that 0 < Λ < 1 and 1/ 2 < π < 1, there exists a unique π ∈ (.5,π)
that solves equation (9). This solution is independent of Ht: π∗
t(Λ,π) = π∗(Λ,π).
(b) π∗(Λ,π) decreases in Λ and increases in π: ∂π∗/∂Λ < 0 and ∂π∗/∂π > 0.
(c) For ﬁxed (Λ,π), π = π∗(Λ,π) maximizes at(Λ,π,π). Further, at(Λ,π,π) increases
in π for π < π∗(Λ,π) and it decreases in π for π > π∗(Λ,π).




Λ +  (F1(π) − F1(π))
Λ +  (F0(π) − F0(π))
, (12)
thus the solution does not depend on the history Ht. Using (10) and (11), we rewrite (12) as
2 G(π)(π − π) − 2 
Z π
π
G(s) ds − Λ(2π − 1) = 0. (13)
Denote the left hand side of the above equation by δ(Λ,π,π). Then
(i) δ(Λ,π,π) strictly decreases in π for π ≤ π: ∂δ/∂π = −2Λ − 2 (G(π) − G(π)) < 0;
(ii) at π = 1/ 2, δ(Λ, 1/ 2,π) = 2 G(π)(π − 1/ 2) − 2 
R π
1/2 G(s) ds > 0;
(iii) at π = π, δ(Λ,π,π) = −Λ(2π − 1) < 0.
Steps (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of π∗(Λ,π).
Proof of (b): Applying the Implicit Function Theorem and diﬀerentiating both sides





2 (G(π) − G(π∗(Λ,π))) + 2Λ
< 0,
24since π∗(Λ,π) ∈ (1/2,π) and G is increasing. Likewise, diﬀerentiating both sides of
equation (13) with respect to π for a ﬁxed Λ and using g to denote the density function




2 g(π)(π − π∗(Λ,π))
2 (G(π) − G(π∗(Λ,π))) + 2Λ
> 0.













where the last equality follows from equation (7). Observe that this last equality
coincides with equation (12). Consequently, there exists a unique π that maximizes
at(Λ,π,π) and this π = π∗(Λ,π).
By (8), at(Λ,π,π) increases in π when β1(Λ,π,π)/β0(Λ,π,π) increases in π. Using
(7), (10), and (11), it can be shown that (∂/∂π)(β1(Λ,π,π)/β0(Λ,π,π)) > 0 when
δ(Λ,π,π) > 0. The desired slopes then follow from part (a).
C.2 Existence in the Limit Order Market: Proof of Theorem 1 (a)
Applying Lemma 2, the equilibrium thresholds are π1
L = π∗(2λ,1) and π2
L = π∗(λ,1).
C.3 Existence in the Dealer Market: Proof of Theorem 1 (b)
By Lemma 2, we know that for every marginal trader of 2 units π2 ∈ (1/ 2,1), there exists
a unique marginal trader π1 = π∗(λ,π2) who is indiﬀerent between buying 1 unit and
abstaining. Further, π1 is increasing in π2. What remains to be shown is that there






2) = 0 (15)
Denote the left hand side of (15) by δD(λ,π2,p). Recall that π2
L = π∗(λ,1) is the
equilibrium threshold for the large quantity in the limit order market. Then
(i) δD(λ,π2,p) strictly decreases in π2 for π2 ∈ (π2
L,1);
(ii) at π2 = π2
L, δD(λ,π2,p) = (Eπ2
L − Eπ∗(λ,π2
L))/2 > 0;
(iii) at π2 = 1, δD(λ,π2,p) = −(1 − Eπ∗(λ,1))/2 < 0,
where step (i) follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that Eπ strictly increases in π for
p ∈ (0,1). Steps (i)−(iii) imply existence and uniqueness of π2 ∈ (π2
L,1) that solves (15).
25This π2 is the equilibrium marginal buyer of large order, π2
D, and the equilibrium marginal
buyer of a small order is π1
D = π∗(λ,π2
D).
The proof of part (b) of Theorem 1 implies, in particular, the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Relation of the equilibrium thresholds) Equilibrium thresholds for large
orders in the limit and the dealer markets, π2
L and π2
D respectively, satisfy π2
L < π2
D.
C.4 Hybrid Market: Proof of Theorem 1 (c) and Proposition 1
As discussed in the main text, we construct the equilibrium in the hybrid market by
adjusting the distribution of noise trading in such a manner that (a) marginal buyers π1
H
and π2
H satisfy the indiﬀerence conditions, and (b) execution costs in the two segments
coincide.
As in the main text, πo
m denotes the equilibrium marginal buyer of o = 1,2 units in
markets m = L,D,H; similarly for ask
o
m. We continue to use λo to denote the mass of
noise traders that buy o units in the limit order segment of the hybrid market and λ to
denote the mass of noise traders that buy either quantity in the isolated markets. The
mass of noise traders that buy o units in the dealer market segment is then λ − λo.
We ﬁrst assume that the marginal buyer π2
H of a large order in a hybrid market
satisﬁes π2
H ≥ π2




D). The fourth step shows that there does not exist an interior hybrid market
equilibrium with π2
H < π2
L. As before, we omit the time subscripts to simplify the
exposition.
Step 1: ∀π2 ∈ [π2
L,1] we ﬁnd λ2(π2) such that π2 satisﬁes the equilibrium condition for






We show that a unique such λ2(π2) exists, that λ2(π2) ∈ [0, λ
2], and d
dπ2λ2(π2) < 0.
Proof: By Lemma 2, for every Λ2 ∈ [0, λ
2], there exists a unique π∗(2Λ2,1) ∈ [π2
L,1] that
solves Eπ = a(2Λ2,π,1) in π. Further, ∂π∗/∂Λ2 < 0, π∗(0,1) = 1, and π∗(λ,1) = π2
L.
With such a 1:1 mapping, we then know that for every π2 ∈ [π2
L,1] there exists a
corresponding Λ2 ∈ [0, λ
2] that solves Eπ2 = a(2Λ2,π2,1), and that it strictly decreases
in π2. Further, Λ2 ∈ (0, λ
2) when π2 ∈ (πL,1). We then deﬁne λ2(π2) = Λ2.
22Recall that the deﬁnition of a(Λ,π,π) assumes that noise traders are drawn from mass Λ and
informed traders are drawn from mass µ. Each hybrid market segment attracts mass µ/2 of informed
traders. Expressing the ask prices in terms of function a thus yields a renormalizing factor 2 in front of
the mass of noise traders. The same applies to π∗(Λ,π).
26Step 2: ∀π2 ∈ [π2
L,1] and given λ2(π2) we construct λ1(π2) and π1(π2) so that they
satisfy, ﬁrst, the equilibrium conditions for the marginal buyer of small size orders
in each segment and, second, the cost equalization condition for small orders when















We show that unique such λ1(π2),π1(π2) exist, λ1(π2) ∈ (λ
2,λ), and d
dπ2π1 > 0.
Proof: By Lemma 2, for every π2 ∈ [π2
L,1] and Λ1 ∈ [λ
2,λ], there exist unique π∗(2Λ1 +
2λ2(π2),1) and π∗(2λ−2Λ1,π2) that satisfy the equilibrium conditions for the marginal
buyer of a small order in limit and dealer market segments respectively. What remains
to be shown is that for every π2 ∈ [π2
L,1] there exists a unique Λ1 that equalizes these








2) = 0. (18)
Denoting the left-hand side of (18) by δH(Λ1,π2),
(i) for Λ1 ∈ [λ
2,λ], we have ∂
∂Λ1δH < 0;
(ii) at Λ1 = λ
2, we have δH(Λ1,π2) > 0 since π∗(λ,π2) < π∗(λ + 2λ2(π2),1);
(iii)at Λ1 = λ, we have δH(Λ1,π2) < 0 since π∗(2λ + 2λ2(π2),1) < π2 = π∗(0,π2).
Parts (i) and (iii) follow by Lemma 2 and the deﬁnition of λ2(π2). Part (ii) is implied
by Eπ∗(λ,π2) < a(λ + 2λ2(π2),π∗(λ,π2),1), since π∗(λ + 2λ2(π2),1) maximizes a(λ +
2λ2(π2),π,1) in π. Using Eπ∗(λ,π2) = a(λ,π∗(λ,π2),π2) and the deﬁnition of λ2(π2),
after some algebraic simpliﬁcation we can rewrite the latter inequality as π∗(λ,π2) < π2,
which holds by Lemma 2.
Together (i)−(iii) imply that there exists a unique Λ1 ∈ (λ
2,λ) that solves (18). We
will henceforth denote this Λ1 by λ1(π2) and the corresponding threshold by π1(π2).
To show that d
dπ2π1 > 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist
π2, ˜ π2 with π2 < ˜ π2, such that π1(˜ π2) ≤ π1(π2). By Step 1, λ2(˜ π2) < λ2(π2). Then we
must have λ1(˜ π2) > λ1(π2) in order for the marginal buyer of a small order in the limit
order market segment to satisfy π∗(2λ1( ˜ π2) + 2λ2(˜ π2),1) ≤ π∗(2λ1(π2) + 2λ2(π2),1).
But λ1(˜ π2) > λ1(π2), together with π2(˜ π2) > π2(π2), implies the reverse inequality for
this marginal buyer in the dealer market segment, π∗(2λ − 2λ1(˜ π2),π2(˜ π2)) > π∗(2λ −
2λ1(π2),π2(π2)), a contradiction.
27Step 3: We show that there exists a unique π2 ∈ (π2
L,π2
D) that satisﬁes the equilibrium
condition for the marginal buyer of a large size order in the dealer market segment,







2 = 0. (19)
Proof: Denote the left hand side of equation (19) by δD(π2). Then
(i) at π2 = π2
L, we have δD(π2























where the last equality is due to the equilibrium condition in the limit order market, and
the inequality is due to π1(π2
L) = π∗(2λ − 2λ1(π2
L),π2
L) < π2
L by Lemma 2 as λ1(π2
L) < λ;
(ii) at π2 = π2
D, we have δD(π2

























where the ﬁrst inequality follows since λ2(π2
D) < λ
2 and function a(Λ,π,π) is decreasing
in Λ. The second inequality is a consequence of Step 2, which showed, in particular,
that λ1(π2
D) > λ
2 and thus π1(π2









By Step 2, it suﬃces to show that d
dπ2a(2λ − 2λ2(π2),π2,1) < 0, which is equivalent to
−dλ2
dπ22 [F1(π2) − F0(π2)] − [f1(π2)(2λ − 2λ2(π2) +  (1 − F0(π2)))
−f0(π2)(2λ − 2λ2(π2) +  (1 − F1(π2)))] < 0.
Since − d
dπ2λ2(π2) > 0 and F1(π2) − F0(π2) < 0, it suﬃces to show that the last term in
brackets is positive. Employing f1(π2)/f0(π2) = π2/(1 − π2) and rearranging, we ﬁnd
that this term is positive if and only if Eπ2 > a(2λ − 2λ2(π2),π2,1). The inequality
holds because Eπ2 = a(2λ2(π2),π2,1) by deﬁnition of λ2(π2), λ2(π2) < λ by Step 1, and
function a(Λ,π2,1) is decreasing in Λ.
Step 4: We show that π2
H cannot be smaller than π2
L.
Proof: Suppose that π2
H < π2
L. Since π2
H = π∗(2λ2,1) and π2
L = π∗(λ,1), Lemma 2
implies that λ2 > λ
2, and consequently Eπ2
H = a(2λ2,π2
H,1) < a(2λ − 2λ2,π2
H,1). Buyer
π2
H then earns negative proﬁts in the dealer market segment and will not trade there, a
contradiction.
Steps 2 and 3 show that λ1 > λ
2 > λ2 and thus yield Proposition 1.
28C.5 Hybrid Market Transactions: Proof of Proposition 2
The number of transactions in each segment is proportional to the total mass of traders.
Since the mass of informed traders is the same in either segment, the number of transac-
tions in the limit order segment is higher when the mass of noise traders there is larger,
λ1+λ2 > 2λ−λ1−λ2. By Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 3, π∗(2λ1+2λ2,1) = π1
H <
π1
L = π∗(2λ,1). Lemma 2 then implies λ1 + λ2 > λ, which yields the desired inequality.
C.6 Execution Costs: Proof of Proposition 3
The market maker is competitive and expects to break even. Thus it must hold that
(E[V |o = 1] − C(1))Pr(o = 1) + (2E[V |o = 2] − C(2))Pr(o = 2) = 0
Using the Law of Iterated Expectations and the indiﬀerence conditions for the marginal
buyers, Eπ1 = C(1) and 2Eπ2−C(2) = Eπ2−C(1), we can rewrite the above equation as
(E[V |o ≥ 1] − Eπ
1)Pr(o ≥ 1) + (E[V |o = 2] − Eπ
2)Pr(o = 2) = 0. (20)
In all three markets, equation (20) implies the following relation
0 = pβ1(2λ,π1,1) − Eπ1   [pβ1(2λ,π1,1) + (1 − p)β0(2λ,π1,1)]
+pβ1(λ,π2,1) − Eπ2   [pβ1(λ,π2,1) + (1 − p)β0(λ,π2,1)],
(21)
where, as deﬁned in Section C.1.1, βv(Λ,π,π) = Λ +  (Fv(π) − Fv(π)). In the pure
limit and dealer markets equation (21) is equivalent to (20). To see that (21) also
holds in the hybrid market, observe ﬁrst that (20) is satisﬁed in each segment of the
hybrid market. Multiplying the segment-speciﬁc equations with the respective execution
probabilities and applying the Law of Iterated Expectations yields (21).23 Deﬁne dn(π) =







where δ(Λ,π,π) is as deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 2 and, in particular, δ(Λ,π,1) =
−(2π − 1)(Λ +  ) + 2 
R π
0 G(s)ds. G is the distribution function of qualities. In the
23Equation (21) can also be obtained by directly rearranging the equilibrium equations for each of
the three markets. Here we provide the more intuitive derivation.






(1 − p)β0(Λ,π,1) + pβ1(Λ,π,1)
dn(π)2 < 0, (23)
Step 1: We show that for every π2 ∈ [π2
L,π2
D] there exists a unique π1(π2) ∈ [π1
D,π2)
that solves (22).







Proof: Denote the left hand side of (22) by ξ(π1,π2). Then
(i) by (23), ∂ξ/∂π1 < 0;
(ii) at π1 = π1
D, we have ξ(π1
D,π2) ≥ 0 for π2 ≤ π2
D, as ξ(π1
D,π2
D) = 0 and ∂ξ/∂π2 < 0;
(iii) at π1 = π2, we have ξ(π2,π2) = −(2π2 − 1)λ/dn(π2) < 0.
Together (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of the desired π1 ∈ [π1
D,π2).
Step 2: Part (a): Market Width for Small Trades. We show that the execution
costs are ordered as follows CD(1) < CH(1) < CL(1).
Proof: By the proof of Theorem (existence), π2
L < π2
H < π2
D. Since in equilibrium,
C(1) = ask
1 = Eπ1 in all 3 markets, it suﬃces to show that π1(π2) deﬁned in Step 1















Step 3: Part (a): Execution Costs for Large Trades. We show that the execution
costs are ordered as follows CL(2) < CH(2) < CD(2).
Proof: The equilibrium conditions for marginal buyers imply that the cost for a large
order coincides with the sum of the marginal buyers expectations, C(2) = Eπ1 +Eπ2. It














Using (23) and (24), the above inequality is true if and only if
(1 − p)β0(λ,π2,1) + pβ1(λ,π2,1)
(1 − p)β0(2λ,π1,1) + pβ1(2λ,π1,1)
< 1.
Rearranging, the latter is equivalent to (1 − p)β0(λ,π1,π2) + pβ1(λ,π1,π2) > 0, which
holds for all π1 ≤ π2.
30Step 4: Part (b): Price Impacts of Small Trades. Price impacts in the dealer
market and the dealer market segment of the hybrid market are determined by the
respective transaction prices; the relation ∆p1
D < ∆p1
H,D thus follows from Step 2.





Proof: Price impacts in the limit order market reﬂect the change in the public expec-
tation after the order size is revealed. The relation ∆p1
L,H < ∆p1





D). The latter holds by Lemma 2 since π2
H < π2































Step 5: Part (b): Price Impacts of Large Trades. To describe the price impacts









Proof: The ﬁrst inequality follows from Step 3, since 2ask
2
D,H = CH(2) < CD(2) = 2ask
2
D.
















C.7 Behavioral Dynamics: Proof of Proposition 4
We show only the proof for the buy-thresholds; the sell-thresholds are analogous.
Lemma 2 implies the result for the limit order market.
Next, trading thresholds in all markets must satisfy the market maker’s zero expected
proﬁt condition, which can be rewritten as equation (22). In the proof of Proposition 3,
we ﬁxed p and viewed equation (22) as the relation between equilibrium thresholds π1
and π2 across diﬀerent markets. Here, we use the same equation but view it as the
relation between price p and equilibrium thresholds π1,π2 within a ﬁxed market.
In dealer and hybrid markets, given the equilibrium marginal buyer of a large or-
der, π2, the equilibrium threshold for a marginal buyer of a small order, π1, only depends
on prior p through π2. Further, π1 is increasing in π2 (this follows from the existence
proofs, C.3 and C.4, Step 2). It thus suﬃces to show that π2 is increasing in p.
In light of the above discussion, for a ﬁxed market, the left-hand side of equation (22)
can be viewed as a function of π2 and p. Denoting this function by ψ(π2,p), we have
31ψ(π2
















where we use π2
p to denote the equilibrium threshold π2 for prior p. It thus suﬃces to
show that ∂ψ/∂p|π2=π2
p > 0. For, we then have ψ(π2
p,p + ǫ) > ψ(π2
p,p) = 0 for ǫ > 0,
and thus π2
p+ǫ that solves ψ(π2
p+ǫ,p + ǫ) = 0 must be strictly above π2
p.
To complete the proof we thus show that ∂ψ/∂p|π2=π2
p > 0. Denoting the equilibrium









































p)   dn(π2
p)
> 0,
where the second equality follows from (22), and the inequality follows as δ(λ,π2
p,1) < 0.
To see the latter, observe ﬁrst, that δ(λ,π2,1)|π2=π2
L = 0 and
∂δ(λ,π2,1)
∂π2 < 0 by the proof
of Lemma 2, and, second, that for m ∈ {D,H}, π2
m > π2
L for any p.
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10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.1 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.2 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.3 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.4 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.5 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.6 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.7 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.75 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.8 + + + + - + - - + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.85 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.95 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.1 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.2 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + +
0.3 + + + + - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + + - - - - -
0.4 + + - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - -
0.5 + - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - -
0.6 - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - -
0.7 - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - -
0.75 - - - - - - - - - + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - -
0.8 - - - - + - - + - + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - -
0.85 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - -
0.9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
0.95 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Table I: Diﬀerences of Averages and Standard Deviations for Price Distributions. This table is based on the
simulations of the closing prices. Rows denote the level of informed trading  , columns denote the entry rate ρ. The top half
of the table reports the sign of the diﬀerence of the average closing prices for a speciﬁc (ρ, )-combination between two markets
that are named at the top of the table. The bottom half of the table reports the sign of the diﬀerence of the standard deviations
of closing prices. As the underlying true value is V = 1, the higher a price is, the closer it is to the true value and the more
eﬃcient it is. Thus a positive diﬀerence of the average closing prices indicates that prices in the ﬁrst named market are more




2 3 4 5 6 7 8
  = 0.2 - - - + + + +
0.5 - - - - + + +
0.8 - - - - - - -
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.2 + + + + + + +
0.5 + + + + + + +
0.8 - - - + + + +
level of informed trading  
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
p = .1 - - - - - - - - -
.2 - - - - - - - - -
.3 - - - - - - - - -
.4 - - - - - - - - -
.5 - - - - - - - - -
.6 + + + + - - - - -
.7 + + + + + + + + -
.8 + + + + + + + + +
.9 + + + + + + + + +
Table II: Diﬀerences of Average Closing Prices and Price Impacts: Transpar-
ent vs. Opaque Hybrid Market. The left table displays the sign of the diﬀerence
of the average closing prices between the transparent and opaque markets as Table I.
The right table displays the sign of the diﬀerence of expected price impacts between the





































































Limit Order minus Hybrid Market Hybrid minus Dealer Market
Figure 3: Volume in Limit Order, Dealer and Hybrid Markets. Each panel
plots the diﬀerence of volumes that arise under the two named market mechanisms.
Volume here is a function of the prior, p, and the level of informed trading,  , as deﬁned
in Subsection IV.C. The graph projects the volume diﬀerence such that   is on the
horizontal axis. Positive values indicate that the volume in the ﬁrst named market
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FOSD LOB vs hybrid
Figure 4: First Order Stochastic Dominance of Closing Prices for   = .5.
The panels plot diﬀerences of empirical distributions FD − FL, FD − FH and FL − FH.
A graph that has only positive values indicates ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. As
FD − FL > 0 for all prices, the distribution of closing prices in the limit order market
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that in the dealer market. Thus prices in the limit














































































































Limit Order minus Dealer Limit Order minus Hybrid Hybrid minus Dealer
Figure 5: The Diﬀerence of Price Impacts. The three panels plot the diﬀerence of
expected price impacts as deﬁned in Subsection IV.D. This diﬀerence is a function of
the probability of informed trading   and the prior p. We display it here as a projection
such that   is on the horizontal axis. If for a given   the graph is entirely above the
horizontal axis, then for that  , price movements in the ﬁrst named market are stronger
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SOSD Hybrid opaque vs transparent
  = .2   = .5   = .8
Figure 6: Second Order Stochastic Dominance of Closing Prices for Transpar-
ent vs. Opaque Hybrid Markets. The panels plot diﬀerences of cumulations of the
empirical distributions,
R p
0 [Fopaque(s)−Ftransparent(s)]ds, for   = 0.2,0.5,0.8. Since the
values are always positive, the distribution of closing prices for the transparent mecha-
nism second order stochastically dominates that for the opaque one. Prices under the



















































































































Figure 7: The Diﬀerence of Price Impacts Transparent vs. Opaque Hybrid
Market. The panels are analogous to Figure 5 and plot the diﬀerence of the expected
price impacts between the transparent and the opaque hybrid markets. The left panel
plots a projection such that the probability of informed trading   is on the horizontal
axis. The right panel plots a projection such that the prior p is on the horizontal axis.
38Result Economic Variable Order of Markets Existing empirical evidence
Proposition 3 (a) market width, small trades dealer < hybrid < LOB
Nimalendran and Petrella (2003)
(LOB vs. hybrid)
lower execution costs (support for
small trade part of our results)
Proposition 3 (a) market width, large trades LOB < hybrid < dealer
Domowitz (2002) (dealer vs. hybrid)
Naik and Yadav (2004) spreads for large
trades decrease dealer vs. hybrid
Proposition 3 (b)
price impact small trades
price impact large trades
LOB & hybrid LOB <
< dealer < hybrid dealer
hybrid dealer < dealer <
< LOB < hybrid LOB
Domowitz (2002) (dealer vs. hybrid)
Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001)
(hybrid only: Toronto)
Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002)
(hybrid only: Helsinki)
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004)
(hybrid only: Paris):
upstairs (dealer) trades have lower price
impact than downstairs (LOB) trades
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) (NYSE): upstairs
price impact lower for large trades
Proposition 4
behavior not time-invariant
in dealer and hybrid markets,
dealer and hybrid markets
have contrarian tendency
contrarianism:
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)
Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) (experimental)
Numerical









Table III: Testable Implications from the Three-way Comparison. This table summarizes the main results and testable
predictions that this paper generates.
3
9Result Description Existing empirical evidence
Proposition 1
self selection of traders in hybrid markets:
relatively more uninformed traders
trade large quantities in the dealer market,
relatively more uninformed traders trade
small quantities in the LOB
Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001) (Toronto)
Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002) (Helsinki)
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) (Paris):
upstairs (dealer) trades have lower information
content than downstairs (LOB) trades
Proposition 2
hybrid market: more small transactions
in the LOB segment; more large
transactions in the dealer segment;
more transactions total in LOB segment
de Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1995): more small trades on
Paris Bourse (LOB) more large trades on LSE (dealer)
Viswanathan and Wang (2002) (NYSE): large orders
ﬁlled by dealers, small orders ﬁlled in the LOB
Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002) (Helsinki):
upstairs trades are larger
Numerical
Observation 3 (a)
hybrid market transparency vs. opaqueness:
with many traders, prices are more eﬃcient in
the transparent market; with few traders, prices
are more eﬃcient in the opaque market
Numerical
Observation 3 (b)
hybrid market transparency vs. opaqueness:
prices in the transparent market second order
stochastically dominate those in the opaque one
Table IV: Testable Implications for the Hybrid Market. This table summarizes the results and testable predications of
our model that pertain to the hybrid market only.
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